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[ 
The Foreign Policy of the United States 
Mike Mansfield (D) Montana 
Let me begin by pointing out that foreign policy is not a formula out 
of the laboratory of an alchemist. It is not a potion which is guaranteed 
to cure the ills of the nation and the world's ills in a single dose. There 
is nothing supernatural about foreign policy and none of us need to stand in 
awe of it. Foreign policy is made by human beings for human situations. \-/hat 
all of us need is to learn more about it--its problem3, its possibilities and 
its limitations--because it has a very profound effect upon our lives. The 
more we know about it, the more we can do to bring it under rational democratic 
control. 
Our foreign policy is simply the course of action whic~ we take to 
safeguard the nation and guide its progress in a very imperfect and highly 
dangerous world. Because of the nature of the postwar world, the course we 
have taken since 1945 has involved a use of our resources on a greater scale 
than ever before in peacetime to influence developments in other parts of 
the world. The use of a prudent part of our resources in this fashion is not 
waste. It is not a callous disregard of our domestic needs in the interest 
of foreign powers . It is a sound investment in the security and well-being 
of E,l~ generation of Americans and the generations that will follow us. If 
we do not make this investment, the possibilities are multiplied that we shall 
waste resources many times greater in a third general 1-1ar at some not too 
distant date. 
There are two ways to live in freedom in an insecure world, One is to 
meet, every day, a segment of the international responsibilities that freedom 
entails, to make them a regular lJart of our lives. The other is to ignore 
these responsibilities until a new tyranny has set the world aflame, and, 
then, drop everything in a last minute effort to keep the fire from reaching 
our homes. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 36, Folder 58, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 2 -
Under the leadership of the President, we have been trying to follow 
the first way. We have used and are using such resources--economic, technical, 
cultural and military--as we can spare, as a form of insurance to promote the 
cause of peace, freedom and progress, and to minimize, thereby, the possibility 
of the rise of aggressive tyranny to the point where it might be in a position 
to strike for world domination. 
The resources which we have available for this international purpose 
are not unlimited. · We can afford to use them only where there is reasonable 
expectation that they will accomplish the objective for which they are intended. 
In general, this will be in situations where the peoples and governments most 
directly involved are alive to the meaning and obligations of freedom and will 
shoulder these obligations if given a helping hand. 
Whatever policy we pursue to-vrards other nations, all of us--directly or 
indirectly--share responsibility for it. All of us gain, if it is the best 
possible course. All of us, as well as generations yet to come, will suffer 
very real losses if it is not. 
You will note that I said the best possible course. In the life of each 
of us, there is usually a considerable gap between our hopes and our 
accomplishments, between the ideal and the actuality. The same thing is true 
in foreign policy. The world we live in is inhabited by men, not Gods, and 
the international situations .in which we find ourselves usually reflect all 
of the shortcomings and imperfections to which mankind is heir. 
In some instances, our foreign policy will follow a particular course 
to meet a given set of circu~tances, In the light of all these circumstances 
it will seem like the best possible course and ferr, if any of us, will 
criticize it or raise any questions about it . Then, three or four years 
later, some who have an oversupply of the wisdom of hindsight and a special 
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aptitude for Honday-morning quarterbacking, will suddenly discover that the 
course that we took three or four years before was all wrong . Naturally, to 
exercise this kind of wisdom, one has to have a very short memory and a Hell-
developed ability to transplant. One has to be able to forget all the circum-
stances that existed at the time the course was originally set, and to 
transplant that course into the circumstances that exist today . 
All of us have some of this kind of wisdom. It is the kind of wisdom 
that makes us say to ourselves or our friends "if I had only bought a hundred 
head of cattle back in 1940, I would be in fine shape today because the price 
of beef is high in 1951." When we indulge our fancy in this way, of course, 
we have to forget that back in 1940 we didn't have the price of a hundred head 
of cattle; or if we had, we would not have been able to buy a ranch to graze 
them on. A little of this wisdom doesn 't do us any damage . It is a harmless 
pastime when practiced by individuals. vle t hinl<: about "what might have been" 
for a few moments and then go about the very real business of living in the 
present. But in connection with foreign policy, if we keep at this .Monday 
morning quarterback:i.ng day in and day out, month in and month out, year in 
and year out, it occupies so much of our time and energy as a nation that we 
have very little left of either to deal 1·rith the pressing situations of the 
day. And some Americans are doing exactly that. The result is that the 
attention of all of us is deflected from the pressing probler~ of current 
international life. If you have felt confused about foreign policy, and who 
among us hasn't, you can exple.in much of that confusion by the constant harangue 
to which vre are subjected to look backward, instead of around. us and fo:nrard. 
It is a harangue that originates in the same kind of mentality that told us 
to look back at the "good old days" when we were trying to fight our vray out 
of the depression in the thirties. 
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What you hear today is that everything would be all right with the n~tion 
and the world if only we hadn't tried, during the war, to get along with the 
Russians; if only President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill hadn't 
signed the Teheran and Yalta Agreements, and President Truman the Potsdam 
Agreement. Hhat these Ivlonday-morning q_uarterbacks conveniently forget, of 
course, is that if we hadn't been fighting with some allies on our side in 
World vJar II we might still be locked in combat with Germany and Japan or have 
been destroyed by those countries. We might have had casualties of 5 million 
or 10 million or 25 million instead of the million or more th~we s~ffered. 
What the Monday morning q_uarterbacks forget is that we got along with Russia 
and made those agree1nents at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam in order to shorten 
Horld vTar II and to make an attempt at establishing a basis f or an enduring 
peace. vlho runong us; at the time, objected to these purposes? Of course 
circumstances have changed since 1945. Of course some of the decisions taken 
at these conferences are inapplicable in the present situation. This does 
' 
not mean that the agreements at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam w·ere the work of 
scoundrels or incompetents. Least of all does it mean that if these 
agreements had never been made the nation would be better off. That will be 
known only when the events of this cent~·y--all the events--are viewed in t~e 
perspective of history. 
But Teheran, Yalta and Potsda~ belong to a past era--the era of the r~se 
of fascist totalitarianism and its defeat. Today, the primary threat to our 
nation, to peace, and to democratic progress sterns from a new totalitarianism 
which has its core in Soviet imperialism. President Roosevelt at Yalta and 
President Truman at Potsdam both tried to prevent a developn~nt of this kind. 
Both sought, at the end of the greatest war, to put a stop to further wars and 
the threat of rTars. They tried to avoid a split runong the victors and to 
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bring together all of the nations of the world into the forward surge of 
mankind. Isn't that what all of us wanted in 1945? Was it wrong to make this 
attempt? I think that the ideal •ras well worth striving for and I think I·Te 
should continue to strive for it. 
Events since 1945, however, have clearly shmm that the ideal of a world 
without the threat of war remains, as it long has been; one of the most 
elusive dreams of mankind. As a nation, we cannot lose ourselves in dreams cf 
the future, just as we cannot take refuge in the "might-have-beens" of the pc.L·c . 
We must continue to live with the realities of the present. 
And the most significant of these realities is the>.t there is once again 
loose in the 1vorld a nation bent upon 1vorld domination. To meet this new 
situation, the course of our foreign policy is being adjusted as rapidly as 
those who wring their hands over the past or who are lost in the future will 
permit. 
By the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947, the aims of the Soviet Union 
had become quite clear. While this country had disarmed hastily, the Russians 
had continued to lceep an enormous mass of soldiers in a state of readiness, ar_d 
had embarked upon a program of ruthless expansion. They had not only compro -· 
mised the independence of countries along their frontier, but internationa~. 
communism was eating its vay into Western Europe via the roads of economis 
misery) social discontent and political instability. Greece and Turkey wer ~ 
under relentless cornnunist pressure. 
It does not take an expert in foreign affairs to see lvhat a collapse in 
Western Europe and the Middle East at that time would have meant to the 
security of this nation and to the world. 
The United States plus Western Etrrope plus their associated countries now 
have an annual production of steel and pig iron more than four times that of 
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the Soviet world; they produce three times as much coal o.nd ten times as much 
petroleum. Move the resources of Western Europe and the associated countries 
to the Soviet side and the comparisons change drastically. 
But beyond the naked fact of the balance of power, the nations which vere 
about to collapse in late 1947 were the birthplace and cradle of \-!estern civi-
lization. The institutions under which we live, the hopes we cherish, the 
origins of most of our citizens, were rooted in those countries. All of then 
have contributed in some fashion to life as we know it. With a return to 
stability they co~ld be expected to continue t o contribute to the advance of 
~e 
civilization. He we, then, to abandon them, in 1947, to a new barbarism? 
We met this threat to the Western World vith great unity of purpose. 
On Barch 12, 1947, the President proposed to Congress that the United States 
extend economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. Under the leadership 
of a great Republican Senator; the late Arthur Vandenberg, Congress passed the 
necessary legislation by an overwhelming bi-partisan vote. This measure--the 
Truman Doctrine--was the real beginning of our struggle to guard the nation 
against the new tyranny looming on the horizon. From this doctrine has sprung 
the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Program, economic and military assistance to countries in the Far and Near East 
and other si@1ificant actions of foreign policy. These ore the programs vhich 
have so far prevented the Soviet Union from striking for world domination and 
precipitating a general war. They have had, until recently, wide bi--partisan 
support. 
I need not review all the details of these programs, but I should like t o 
survey briefly some of the progress which has been illade in carrying them out. 
Just this month> at General Eisenhovrer 's :r:eque st, I had occasion to visit 
Europe and to observe this progress first-hand. 
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As of the first months of 1951 the basic aims of the Marshall Plan had 
been largely, although not completely, achieved. The communists in Western 
Europe had made every effort to sabotage the project, and they had failed. 
( 
Industrial output had risen almost 40 percent above the level of 1938; trade 
and exchange difficulties had lessened considerably; and there were good 
Frospects for continuing economic improvement. 
The threat of political collapse, so acute in 19~·7, has been averted. 
Discontent, by no means, has disappeared--as the results of the recent elect:· • .c:: 
in Italy show--but the gloom of defeatism that hung over the region has liftecL . 
Europeans dare to believe again in a future of freedom. 
To protect these gains in Western Europe, a f ar-reaching security system 
has been established. The United Nations charter has provided the basis for 
this system. It exFlicitly recognizes the inherent and fundamental right of 
member states to defend themselves collectively against attack and provides 
for the formation of regional security arrangements. Under these provisions 
we had, in September 1947, already joined with the Latin American countries in 
establishing a system of mutual defense for the Western Hemisphere. After the 
passage of the Vandenberg Resolution by the Senate in June 1948, with its 
obvious reference to the North Atlantic Co1nmunity, this country began to work 
out a plan of mutual defense with the Western European nations. On April 4, 
1949, twelve nations--the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France , Italy, 
Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Portugal--
signed the North Atlantic Treaty. 
The purpose of this treaty is strictly defensive. It threatens no 
nation except a would-be aggressor. It operates primarily as a deterrent, 
serving formal notice that an attack upon any part of the Atlantic Community 
1-rill be met vi th the united resistance of the whole. If the Russians ever 
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nourished the expectation that the ripened plum of a recovered Europe could be 
plucked with impunity, they now know differently. 
The organization to carry out the obligations of this treaty is already 
in operation. Most of the military commanders have been appointed and the 
strategic plans are being placed in readiness. Under the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Act, we are trying to fill what General Eisenhower called "the great, 
the crying need (for) the impedimenta. of armies, of nc>.vies, of air forces." 
The sudden outbreak of the Korean aggression compelled the Free World to 
revise its estbnate of Soviet intentions. We have speeded up the delivery of 
military supplies to Europe and increased our commitments in this respect. A 
decision has been made to include vlestern German camtributions to the defense 
pool and consideration is being given to adding others from Spain. 
In a further effort to bolster Western defenses and to fortify the morals 
of the He stern Europeans who dread an occupation by Red troops, even though the 
Soviet Union might eventually be defeated, the United States recently decided 
to send four Army divisions to Western Germany in addition to the two already 
there. There was considerable opposition to this step in some quarters for 
several reasons, prominent among H'hich vras a fear that large American f orces 
might be drawn into a land war against the vast populations commanded by the 
Soviet Union. Secretary of Defense Marshall, however, has made clear that the 
plan is for the Western Europeans to supply the bulk of the land armies needed 
for their defense . 
That Soviet aggression can be deterred has been demonstrated over and over 
again . The record which has been a chieved during the past f ive years has come 
from follovring a course of no appeasement, cooperation with free nations and 
devotion t o peace. We have negotiated with the Russians--as in the case of 
Berlin--but we have not appeased. We have yielded to the vrishes of our all ies 
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on some issues and they have yielded to ours on others. Here at home we have 
refUsed to retreat into a new isolationism and, at the same time, we have held 
in check those who think that a bomb dropped on Moscow will not only begin a 
war but end it. 
What is the record of the past five years in brief? The Soviet Union has 
not dared to precipitate a general war; Yugoslavia has broken loose from the 
Moscow chains; Greece--the gateway to the Middle East--has been saved from 
destruction. Efforts of the cormnunists to capture He stern Europe by capital-
izing on economic misery and social unrest have been thwarted by the European 
Recovery Plan. The menace of communist armed aggression has been counteracted 
by the North Atlantic defense program, The Berlin airlift was a dramatic demon-
stration of the manner in which western determination and technical ability can 
create a situation in which bonafide negotiations with the Russians became 
possible . 
The record of our foreign policy in Europe is a record of accomplishment, 
written in spite of the dire predictions of a fevr in our midst who continue to 
ignore the responsibilities of the hour while they read and re-read the Teheran, 
Yalta, and Potsdam agreements. 
Or if it is not these agreements, then it is the Far East that occupies 
them practically to the exclusion of the rest of the world. It is as though the 
sun of international events not only rises in the East but also sets in the East . 
This i s the region that has given rise to most of the conflict over our 
foreign policy. The typhoon now raging about Capital Hill in Washington 
originated in the vicinity of Formosa . Typhoon is one of the few words in the 
English language that is derived from the Chinese. It is taken from two Chinese 
characters -- "die" and "fung" which, together, mean "big wind . " It is quite a 
typhoon - - this controversy over Far Eastern policy - - and, like most of the 
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storms that blow out of the China Sea, it is full of sound and fury. 
This sound and fury, unfortunately, conceals a wide belt of calm -- un area 
of substantial agreement upon which a stable Far Eastern policy can be conducted. 
There is, for example, practically no disagreement among responsible persons in 
the Government as to the fundamental facts of the Asian situation today. The 
Administration and qualified Members of Congress have long recognized them and 
General MacArthur, in his farewell address to both Houses, reviewed them. 
In Asia, today, 1ve are face-to-face with a transition of continental 
proportions. Events of the past few years have stirred half the population of 
the earth--more than a billion human beings--into a state of restless agitation. 
These people differ widely in race, culture and outlook. In some ways, 
however, their lot has been the same. Over the centuries, most of them 
acquiesced in the rule of native tyrants or the control of foreigners. Most of 
them endured--seemingly without complaint--a life of ignorance, disease and 
incredible poverty. Billions were born, lived out a brief life span -- usually 
under 30 years -- and died. Millions were swept away in a stroke, by famine, 
flood or epidemic. These catastrophes were quickly forgotten in the struggle 
of the living to survive. Life went on -- compelling and unchanging. This 
was the "changeless East." 
But beneath the surface serenity of resignation, a ferment of discontent 
has been churning for decades, building up great pressures for social and 
political change. From time to time, there were varning signs, as for example, 
the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and the rioting and insurrections throughout 
Southern and Southeast Asia between the two wars. 
Then came World War II and the surface calm gave way once nnd for all 
under its powerful impetus . Vast forces were released. From Korea to 
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Pakistan, from Mongolia to the Philippines -- tidal waves of unrest rolled 
over this innnense area. Millions of people were caught up in the cross-currents, 
propelled by two fundamental drives -- a common determination to end foreign 
domination and to do something about the crushing poverty ,.rhich, for centuries, 
had produced the cycle of birth, miserable life and early death. 
The transition which is taking place in the Far East is not a gentle one . 
In many places, it already has engendered violence on a scale unprecedented in 
recent history. 11illions have died as a direct or indirect result of the civil 
conflicts in China and Southeast Asia and in the religious strife that raarked 
the partition of the Indian subcontinent. Hillions more have been uprooted 
and are on the move . They are seeking new roOts to sustain life and to give it 
meaning and direction. 
These, then, are the facts of the Far East of 1951. Half the world is 
in transition, and often, in violent transition. This transition holds 
tremendous possibilities for good but it also carries the seeds of a potentially 
enormous evil. 
If the nevr nations of the Far East can maintain their independence and the 
new governments can deal effectively with the accumulated problems of their 
people, there is every reason to believe that they will make a profound contri-
bution to their own development, to the cause of peace and to the general 
advancement of mankind. If, on the other hand, they fall victims to a new 
imperialism -- whether it be of the type recently advanced by Japan or the more 
subtle type now emanating from the Soviet Union -- if this should occur, then 
the rest of the world, and we as a part of it, would be exposed to a grave danger. 
There is u real prospect of this happening because in the confusion and 
frustrations of the hour, men often turn to the easy way out, the quick and 
unreasoned solution to their difficulties. Communism or other reactionary 
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movements, based on such slogans as "Asia for the Asians" offer very real 
enticements, however delusive, to the hungry and discontented. 
Some may wish that the facts in the Far East were otherwise, Some may 
long for the old days of the "changeless East" and its "unspoiled charm," but 
these cannot be recalled. 
The fact is that we must conduct Far Eastern pplicy within the framework 
of a "changing East" -- a rapidly, erratically and, frequently, violently 
"changing East." To imagine that the situation is otherwise ''ill lead us to 
build a policy on sands of unreality and to court, thereby, its repeated 
collapses. 
But recognition of the facts of the situation in Asia is only one 
prerequisite to sound policy. For the Far East is only a part of the larger 
framework of foreign policy which is the globe itself. And Far Eastern policy, 
if it is to serve the nation, must be viewed in that total perspective. \le 
cannot concentrate our attention exclusively on Asia. To do so, is to ignore 
regions which, at this moment in history, are at least as vital. 
In the Far East we can bring to bear a prudent part of the resources 
which we have available for international purposes in an effort to influence 
developments in the direction of peace, freedom and progress, VJe cannot deploy 
all our resources to that area without leaving others, such as Europe and the 
Middle East, dangerously exposed. 
There are some situations in the Far East with vrhich, by working construc-
tively with others, we can deal effectively. In these situations we should 
act, and vre are acting. But under no circumstances ought we to assume unilat-
eral responsibility for everything that happens in Asia or for the future of 
that vast continent. Under no circumstances should we overcommit ourselves, 
even in the name of an anti-communist crusade. Korea is not the only country 
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in the world that lives in the shadow of communist imperialism. Communism, 
itself, is not the first form of tyranny that has threatened the world, nor is 
it, necessarily, the last. The way to a world of freedc .. 1 and international 
decency is long and difficult and we will do well to draw judiciously upon our 
strength as we move along it. 
In general, that is what we have done in the Far East and that is what 
we are doing now. Mistakes have been made and others may be expected. Foreign 
policy is made by human beings and human beings make mistakes. As I have 
already pointed out, all of us contribute directly or indirectly to our foreign 
policy and we share responsibility for its success or failure. 
I think, however, that we need not be ashamed of the course we have 
/. 
pursued in the Far East for five years. When it is viewed in its entirely, 
within the framework of the facts of Asia and the larger framework of the 
global situation -- the record is good. I go further and suggest that beneath 
the sound and fury of the present controversy, it will be found that li~st persons 
in this country -- regardless of party -- generally have supported and will 
continue to support that policy. 
Let us examine this thesis against the record of our activity in the Far 
East since 19!~5. 
In the Philippines we fulfilled promptly our long-standing pledge to grant 
independence to the islands. We kept our wartime promise t o aid in recon-
struction, providing f or this purpose technical assistance, hundreds of millions 
of doll2rs of direct compensation to those who suffered losses, and surplus 
property of enormous value at a negligible price. In 1946, we also worked out 
mutual defense arrangements that are designed to safeguard the Philippines from 
a repetition of invasion as well as to enhance our own security. 
As far as I can determine, there has been no serious opposition to any of 
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these measures in Congress or out of Congress. They have had wide bipartisan 
support. It is not over the Philippine policy, then, that the present contro-
versy rages. 
But in spite of our efforts and those of many conscientious Filipinos, 
the islands have not made the progress which might have been expected. 
Last year there were alarming reports that the Philippines might go the 
way of China. The reasons advanced were much the same corruption in 
government, unfair economic advantage to a favored few at the expense of the 
many, and the growth in strength of a communist-led revolutionary group in the 
countryside . 
What could 1-re have done in these circumstances? Reverse the independence 
granted a fevr short years ago and reoccupy the islands? To illustrate the 
difficulty in such a course, I might point out that when ve requested permission 
to post Marines as guards at our embassy in .Manila because of the tense 
situation, the Philippine government hotly rejected the request as an affront 
to its sovereignty. But even if the course of reoccupation were feasible, the 
direct control of the Philippines would require an enormous allocation of our 
economic and military resources. v!hat would be left for other areas? Are 
the American people willing to assume an increased tax burden and new casualty 
lists for this purpose? 
A second alternative vould be to abandon the islands to their fate and 
risk their falling into unfriendly hands . One consideration and there 
are others -- indicates how dangerous this course would be. We regard Formosa 
as vital to the security of the Pacific. Hov much more so are the Philippines! 
Confronted with a set of facts of this kind, our Philippine policy has 
taken the only direction that is practical. We have not assumed primary 
responsibility f or the political administration, the internal security or the 
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domestic economy of the Philippines. The Filipino people were demanding, in 
effect, the right to deal with these problems themselves when they sought 
independence. We conceded them that right when we set them free, These 
problems, properly, are the primary responsibility of the Filipinos. Our role, 
necessarily, is that of R neighbor who has had a long and close relationship 
with the islands. In this role, 1ve have increased our military assistance and 
our technical aid to help them meet the present abnormal situation. The 
President has sone a step further and has called upon the Philippine government 
to undertake certain basic reforms as a condition for additional econon1ic help. 
The Filipinos have given evidence of a willingness to make the necessary 
improvements and Congress is now considering a measure which will provide that 
help. 
We cannot be certain that this policy will succeed. There is no 
assurance that as a result of it the Philippines will emerge a s a progressive 
..) 
and stable member of the Free World. In the planning and execution of foreie;n 
policy, there are rarely certainties, The most that we can hope for is that we 
have chosen the best possible course of action in the light of a given set of 
circumstances. Many people have compla ined about the situation in the 
Philippi nes but no one, so far as I am aware, has offered a policy approach 
differing basically from the three I have suggested here. That is -- get in, 
get out, or help out . The way we have chosen is neither the way of imperialism 
which is to get in, nor the way of isolationism which is to get out. It is the 
American way, rrhich is to help out, 
I have dwelt at length on the Philippines for it illustrates the complex 
problems which confront our policy-makers elsewhere in the Far East. In 
southern ~nd southeast Asia we have also sought to deal with the facts of the 
situation in the same way -- neither by getting in nor getting out, but by 
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helping out. We have cooperated with many friendly nations in this region. 
In the case of Indonesia, we contributed through the United Nations, t o 
its relatively peaceful transition from colonial status to independence. We 
are now attempting to bring about a similar transition in Indo-China in the 
face of a communist-led revolt. Throughout this vast area of southern and 
southeast Asia, we have in operation, today, programs of economic, technical 
and military assistance and cultural exchange. Only recently Congress passed 
legislation to make available grain for India in an effort to forestall a 
threatened frunine. 
These programs represent a judicious use of the resources which we are 
able to allocate to this region. They are gestures of sincere friendship, 
evidences of our 'villingness to help in deeds as well as words. They are, 
as all measures of this kind ought to be, a mixture of generosity and 
reasonable self-interest. 
As in the Philippines, there is no assurance that all of them will 
accomplish the purposes for which they are intended. As in the Philippines, 
primary responsibility rests where it belongs -- with the peoples and 
governments of the various recipient nations. 
Taken as a whole, policy in southern and southeast Asia has had over-
whelming support in both Houses of Congress. This is another area of 
substantial bipartisan agreement that the present controversy conceals. 
With respect to Japan, World War II projected us into a situation of 
primary responsibility. As the Power principally responsible for the Japanese 
defeat, we were compelled to occupy the vacumn which that defeat produced and 
to exercise the primary authority which that occupation entailed. 
After V-J Day, policy for Japan, conceived and prepared by the State and 
Defense Departments under the President's direction was carried out by General 
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MacArthur until his replacement by General Ridgway as Supreme Commander. Nost 
available reports indicate that the Occupation has been admirably conducted. 
The Japanese have made considerable progress in democratizing their social and 
political institutions and, with substantial P~erican assistance, have done 
much to restore their battered economy. i·le are moving, now, t0vrards a peace 
settlement with or 1-rithout Soviet participation. Once a treaty has been signed, 
we hope that Japan vill mal~e a contribution to the maintenance of peace and 
orderly international progress . We will, then, get out of that country but 
still will be in a position to help out, if necessary, particularly with 
respect to defense against aggression from the mainland . 
There have been scattered criticisms of our occupation of Japan under 
General Mac.l\rthur's direction. Some have said that it was "too soft" and some 
that it was "too hard." The balance of informed opinion, however, has been 
favorable. Certainly, there has been little criticism of it in Congress by 
either party. In this case, too, the sound and fury of partisan criticism of 
Far Eastern policy has drowned out an extremely important area of agreement. 
Having passed through a belt of calm encircling the Philippines, southern 
and southeast Asia and Japan, we come to China which is at the very core of 
the storm. I should like to state at the outset that I do not believe any 
reasonable person would have conducted China policy very much differently 
than it has been conducted since 1945. We have had three Secretaries of State 
since the enU. of World War II -- James Byrnes, General Harshall and Dean 
Acheson . All three were confronted with a given set of facts. All three 
approached these facts in substantially the same WEnner. 
To ~e the point clearer, let us go back to V-J Day . At that time, we had 
air and naval power in the Vlestern Pacific. lve had a small force in China, 
mostly service troops. General HacArthur had advised General Vledemeyer who was 
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then in connnand in China that he could not spare additional men from his armies 
which were scheduled to serve in the Japanese occupation. 
In Chine. there were tw·o major opposing military forces, one under the 
control of the Co~~~sts and the other under the control of the Nationalists. 
The Comnrunists were spread all over the North China countryside ready to move 
immediately on the great Eastern cities and into ~1anchuria . If Civil \Tar came, 
they had a decided positional advantage. 
The Nationalist armies were in west and south China , far from the major 
strategic centers. They had an overwhelming superiority in numbers and 
equipment but because of China's incredibly poor transportation system, they 
could not get this superiority into position to make it effective. 
In these circumstances we had to choose a course from among three 
alternatives -- the same three which we have faced all over Asia: to get in, 
to get out, or to help out. In this case, to get in would have meant stopping 
the impending civil war at whatever cost to ourselves, using our soldiers in 
whatever number required, and assuming full responsibility for restoring all 
of China to Chiang's rule. Would the Chinese people, whose suspicion of foreign 
interference in their internal affairs is traditional, have welcomed this move? 
Would we, ourselves, in 1945 have tolerated committing an unknown number of our 
men to China for an indefinite period? To get in, in this sense, even if 
desirable, was manifestly impracticable. 
Could we have gotten out? We could have; but it would have meant leaving 
three million Japanese soldiers and civilians in China, since the National 
Government was incapable of handling their repatriation. It would have meant 
abandoning the Nationalist government which we recognized and had supported 
throughout the conflict without an opportunity t o restore stability to war-torn 
China. Furthermore, the evidence we had, then, indicated that most of the 
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Chinese people still looked to this government for leadership in bringing all 
the factions together, in preventing civil war, and in reconstructing the 
country. 
Therefore, we took the third alternative. We helped out -- not the 
Chinese Communist but the legal, National Government of China. We transported 
by sea and air 400 to 500 thousand of Chiang Kai-shek's troops over and arotmd 
the communist forces. These troops vrent into key strategic sectors in east and 
north China. Fifty thousand American marines held such vital centers of 
communication as Peiping, Tientsin and Tsingtao to prevent their seizure by the 
Chinese communists. 
Furthermore, we continued to supply the National Goverrunent with lend-
lease aid for months after the conclusion of the war. By the end of 1945, we 
had delivered sufficient tonnage to equip 39 divisions of ground forces and an 
eight and one-third group air force. 
In December 1945, Chiang Kai-shek held a numerical superiority over the 
communists of five to one. He had a monopoly of heavy equipment and mechanical 
transport and an unopposed air arm. He held the key communications centers. 
Yet by December 1948, exactly three years later, this preponderance of 
strength had been so dissipated that General Barr, head of our militBxy 
advisory mission in China, was f orced to conclude that without direct involve-
ment of the United States with its combat forces, the defeat of the Nationalists 
on the mainland was inevitable. 
What lies behind this amazing failure? 
You will hear it blamed on General Marshall's attempt to mediate bet"lveen 
the Nationalists and the Communists. The fact is that the Nationalists 
occupied more strategic military positions when General Marshall left China at 
the end of 1946 than when he arrived at the beginning of 1946. The fact is 
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that in mediating, General Marshall 1¥as following the established policy of t he 
National Government. For years, Chiang had claimed that he was trying t o settle 
the communist question by political methods and not by civil war. 
You will hear that the failure came about because General Marshall tried 
to force the Nationalists to take Communists into the government. The f act i s 
that Communists had been brought into the government by Chiang, himself, l ong 
before Marshall ever arrived in China. The fact is that not a s ingle cormm.:niot 
was added to that government as a result of General Harshall;s mediation. The 
fact is that the Harshall Mission was welcomed by Chiang with open arms and he 
prevailed on General Marshall to remain as mediator when the latter >;anted to 
withdraw. 
If any prominent P~rican in 1946 opposed Marshall's trip to China to 
mediate the Chinese conflict between the major opposing ~Toups, he gave n o 
public and, as far as I can determine, private expression of his disagreement. 
In December 1945, General HacArthur, Ge-neral vledemeyer and Admiral Spruance 
sent the following message to Washington from the Far East before BeneTai 
Marshall's departure: 
It is suggested that United States assistance to China be 
made available as a basis for negotiation by the .American 
JUnbassador to bring together and effect a compromise 
between the major opposing groups in order to promote 
a unified democratir China. 
J... ~ I ~ 
In June 1951, Admiral Spruance says that the negotiations between the 
"major opposing groups" in this message meant between the Communists ru1d 
r/ ..... 
Nationalists; General Wedemeyer fir st implied that it didn't and then that it 
did. General HacArthur, however, dissents and speaks of the Conununists a s "but 
a nebulous threat" at the time. You can unclerstand some of the difficulties of 
conducting foreign policy when there is disagreement among three prominent 
military leaders as to who the "major opposing force s" in China were in 1945. 
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Another reason advanced for the Nationalist collapse on the mainland is 
the inadequacy of American aid. We are asked, in effect, to be ashamed of 
ourselves and to feel guilty for failing to be more generous tmvards Chiang 
Kai-shek, 
But since V-J Day this country has extended military and economic aid 
valued at about two billion dollars to the Chinese Government. Two billion 
dollars of taxpayers money to Chiang Kai-shek. It is possible, of course, to 
argue the precise amount. Millions of words have been wasted in proving that 
it WE!.s closer to one billion or three billion. Can anyone honestly believe 
that one billion or tvro billion or five billion dollars more aid would have 
held the lid on the gigantic upheaval that has taken place in China these past 
five years? As it ivas, an enormous part of the military equipment e;iven to 
Chiang wound up in the hands of the communists. In the comm1nist victory 
parades during October 1949 in Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai and other cities , 
captured American arms and equipment streamed past the reviewing stands hour 
after hour. Where did this equipment come from? From Nationalist armies which 
surrendered or went over to the communists. Where is it now? A lot of it is 
in Korea--in the l1ands of our eneraies. Yet, the Administration is scolded for 
not having Cl.one more of the same thing. 
Can anyone honestly believe that more arms and a thousand American military 
advisors in place of the 500 that served Chiang would have saved the National 
Government on the mainland? Would additional aid have curbed that government's 
disastrous strategy? Would it have created a fighting morale? Vlould it have 
put an end to corruption and raisrule? 
The fact is that our help failed because there was missing in the 
Nationalist Governn~nt at that time, the will and ability to use our help 
effectively. He could not supply the will and if we had tried to supply the 
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ability, in ull probability we would have had to get in completely. 
Only since it has been confined to the island of Formosa hus Chiang's 
Government begun to take the necessary measures to make itself truly responsive 
to the needs of the ordinary Chinese people. In these circumstances, there is 
some hope that the economic and military assistance which we are still supplying 
to the island of Formosa can prove effective. We are justified in continuinG 
that aid, just as \ve are justified in continuing to recognize the National 
Government because it is becoming more representative of the real aspirations 
of the Chinese people as the Connnunist regime in Peking grmrs less represen-
tative. Since it emerged from the countryside; the latter has steadily drawn 
avray from the people of China and their real interests . It has become more 
and more a tool of Russian foreign policy, permitti ng itself finally to be led 
into a course of tossing thousands of Chinese lives to senseless slaughter in 
the Korean aggression. 
Despite the complexity of the Chinese situation, I believe that once the 
facts ure fully appreciated, there will be little real disagreement on the part 
of most Americans that the course we followed in China was about the only 
reasonable one vre could have followed. There vras not too little American 
support for the National Government. If anything, in the light of known 
circumstances, there 1Yas too much. 
The same is not true for Korea. In that country, on June 25, 1950, 
communist imperialism, for the first tilre since the end of vlorlcl Har II, 
resorted to the tactic of armed invasion. The issue immediately became larger 
than Korea. It became, in the final analysis, the issue of peace or general 
war. 
The response of the Free \Jorld to this issue was inm1ediate. On June 27th, 
the President ordered fleet and 2.ir units into action as the u. N. cc:lled upon 
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all nations to assist the victim of aggression. Americans gave their spon-
taneous and wholehearted support to the decision. 
The objectives vrhich we had in going into Korea, and which 'I-re still have, 
is to preserve the south Korean Republic; to stop and to punish the aggression 
against that Republic; to make clear to all would-be imperialists, as we failed 
to make clear to Japanese end Nazi ilnperialists in the thirties, that the force 
of tyra...nny will be met by the force of freedom; that there will be no cheap 
conquests of the weak by the strong; that the greater the aggression the 
greater will be the fearful retribution. By stopping a l ocal aggression we 
hope to prevent a general war later; by fighting in Korea now.we hope to suve 
this land of ours from attack in the future. 
When Captain James Jabara, the leading pilot of the United Nations in 
Korea, landed back in the United States, he '\oms greeted first by a reporter 
from his home town of vlichita, Kc-nsas. The reporter asked: "vlhy are we fighting 
in Korea'l" Jo.bara answered: "So that we 'von't have to fight in Wichita." 
These are the reasons we are in Korea. They are fine and decent and 
sensible reasons. Those who speak disparagingly or cynically of them 
prostitute the finest part of the American ideal--a willingness to sacrifices 
now so that our children and our children's children shall live their lives in 
a better and more satisfying world. 
What we did not set out to do in Korea, what we were not required by any 
mandate of the United Nations to do, was to unify all of Korea by force. The 
task of unifying Korea, is a task for the Korean people themselves with whatever 
help may be given them by the United Nations. vlhat we did not set out to do was 
to conquer Hanchuria. What we did not set out to do was to carry Chiang Kai-shek 
back to the mainland on the shield of the United States. Whe.t we did not set 
out to do was to begin Vlorld Har III. 
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We failed once to distinguish what we set out to do and what we did not set 
out to do in Korea. I trust that w·e shall not fail again. Last November, 
United Nations forces had scored the remarkable victory that carried them from 
practically a beach-head at Pusan back to the 38th parallel. At that point 
we had accomplished what we had set out to do. We had met the aggressors, 
punished them severely, and all but destroyed their armies. The security 
of our forces made it necessary to advance some distance beyond the 38th 
parallel. 
When these forces had reached the narrow defensible neck of the Korean 
peninsula, some miles south of the Chinese border, I urged that we call a halt 
to the advance and try to create a buffer zone along the Chinese Manchurian and 
Korean frontier. But, apparently, in the mistaken belief that the Chinese 
Communists would not enter the war, that we could "end. the war by Christmas" 
our troops were sent probing, in dangerously extended lines, towards the Chinese 
border. 
The rest is too well known to you to bear extensive repeating. The 
Chinese Communists entered the conflict. We suffered a major defeat. Some 
of those who just a few weeks before had been most vociferous in urging our 
advance to the Chinese border now began to press for two alternatives--either 
the complete abandonment of Korea or the extension of the war all the vray into 
Manchuria and beyond. This "get in or get out" extreruism vrould have profited 
no one but our enemies. 
To have abandoned Korea, at that moment, would have been to s~crifice 
the very purposes for which we entered the conflict. It would have meant 
laying not only all of Korea but all of the Far East open to new attacks by 
communist imperialism. To have extended the war to the Chinese mainland, on 
the other hand, vould have meant an involvement--when considered in the light 
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of the critical situations elsewhere--far beyond our military capacity at the 
time to support. The latter course could have had only two outcomes. If the 
Soviet Union chose to back the Chinese Communists, it would have meant the 
beginning of World War III. If, on the other hand, the Russians chose to stay 
out, it would have meant a unilateral involvement of this country on the Chinese 
mainland. 
In the first case we would have had the very thing which, in our own 
interests and in the interests of civilization, we are trying t o prevent. In 
the second case , we would have had what General Bradley so aptly termed "wrong 
war, wrong place, wrong time, wrong enemy." 
Suppose we gained this cheap and easy victory over the Chinese Communists 
which some seemed to think possible by the use of our air and sea povrer and 
Chiang's troops. What would we have gained except the continuing responsibility 
of trying to keep the Generalissimo in power in a devastated China at untold 
billions of dollars in costs. 
And if we did not defeat the Chinese Communists easily, 'lvhat then? He 
would do as vre have done in Korea, send ground forces in after sea and air 
power had failed to bring an immediate victory. The vast maw of the Chinese 
mainland can absorb millions of ground troops. We could tie up the bulk of our 
military resources in a secondary arena of combat, leaving western Europe--the 
real prize--and other vital aree.s bare t o Soviet conquest. If World 'Har III 
must come, it will not be w·on or lost in South China . 
We have to keep our eyes on the ob jective, and the place to do this at 
the present time is in Korea . Under General Ridgway's command, the United 
Nations have once again returned to a position roughly comparable to the one 
held l ast December . Once again a moment of decision is at hand. 
It is a nmment to restate the aims of our foreign policy. That policy is 
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and must continue to be based on the principles of no appeasement and pe~ce--
not peace at any price, but peace as long as it is humanly and decently and 
honorably possible to strive for it. To achieve that peace '"e must be prepared 
to negotiate, provided the aggressors recognize the error of their ways and, 
provided; the negotiations lead to a settlement that achieves our purposes. 
Appeasement and negotiation are not the same things. To use means other than 
military to achieve reasonable international objectives is in keeping with our 
best traditions. We would do well to be wary of partisan tongues in this country 
that are q_uick to lick the label of appeasement on every non-military nction we 
take. Such tongues could lead our foreign policy into repeated blind alleys 
and, ultimately, into chaos, unnecessary war or confused retreat. 
As to specific policy based on these principles of no appeasement and 
peace, I believe the facts of the situation suggest that the wisest course in 
Korea at this time would be for the qN forces to remain in the vicinity of 
the 38th parallel so that the South Korean Republic can be reestablished in its 
own right. Beyond that, South Korean forces should be sent further northward 
to the vicinity of the 39th parallel so as to increase the defensive strength 
of South Korea and to establish a status q_uo that can be maintained. In my 
opinion this move will be a long step towards stopping Stalin's plans to 
involve us in all-out war in Asia; it will allow South Koreans, ,.,ith UN help, 
to start rebuilding their country, and it will have accomplished our original 
purpose of making clear that aggression does not pay. South Korea should 
assume an increasingly active role in its own defense and ve should seek 
greater military commitments for Korea from other UN members with a vie,·r to 
reducing the size of the funerican contingent. 
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EXTENSION OF REMARKS 
or 
HON. 1\UKE MANSFIELD 
OF MONTANA 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Speaker, under 
unanimous consent, I am placing in the 
REcor.D a copy of a speech which I gave 
before the annual meeting of the Mon-
tana Bar Association in Butte, Mont., on 
June 30, 1951: 
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF TilE UNITED STATES 
Let me begin by pointing out that foreign 
policy Is not a formula out of the laboratory 
of an alchemist. It Is not a potion which Is 
guaranteed to cure the Ills of the nation 
and the world's Ills In a single dose. There 
Is nothing supernatural about foreign policy 
and none or us need to stand In awe of it. 
Foreign policy Is made by human beings !or 
human Eltuatlons. What all of us need Is to 
learn more about It--Its problems, Its possl-
b!lltles and Its limitations-because It has a 
very profound efi'ect upon our live:;. The 
more we know about It, the more we can do 
to bring lt under rational democratic control. 
Our foreign J:Ollcy is simply the course or 
action which we take to safeguard the Nation 
and guide Its progress ln a very Imperfect 
and highly dangerous world. Because of the 
nature of the postwar world, the course we 
have taken since 1945 bas Involved a use or 
our resources on a greater scale than ever 
before In peacetime to Influence develop-
ments ln other parts of the world. The use 
or a prudent part or our resources In this 
fashion Is not waste. It ls not a callous 
disregard of our domestic needs In the Inter~ 
est of foreign powers. It Is a sound Invest-
ment In the security and well-being of this 
generation of Americans and the generations 
that will follow us. If we do not make this 
Investment, the possiblllties are multiplied 
that we shall waste resources many times 
greater ln a third general war at some not 
too distant date. 
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There are two ways to live in freedom ln 
an Insecure world. One Is to meet, every 
day, a segment or the International respon-
sibilities that freedom entails, to make them 
a regular part of our lives. The other is to 
Ignore these responsib111ttes untll a new 
tyranny has set the world aflame, and, then, 
drop everything in a last minute effort to 
keep the fire from reaching our homes. 
Under the leadership of the President, we 
have been trying to follow the first way. 
We have used and are using such resources--
economic, technical, cultural, and m111tary-
as we can spare, as a form of Insurance to 
promote the cause of peace, freedom, and 
progress, and to minimize, thereby, the pos-
sib!llty of the rise or aggressive tyranny to 
the point where It might be ln a position to 
strike for world domination. 
The resources which we have available for 
this International purpose are not unlimited. 
We can afford to use them only where there 
Is reasonable expectation that they wlll ac-
complish the objective for which they are 
Intended. In general, this will be In situa-
tions where the peoples and governments 
most directly Involved are alive to the mean-
Ing and obligations of freedom and wlll 
shoulder these obligations If given a helping 
hand. 
Whatever policy we pursue toward other 
nations, all of us--directly or Indirectly-
share responsibility for tt. All of us gain, If 
It Is the best possible course. All or us, as 
well as generations yet to come, will suffer 
very real losses If 1 t Is not. 
You wUI note that I said the best possible 
courEe. In the life of each of us, there Ia 
usu:Uly a considerable gap between our hopes 
and our accomplishments, between the Ideal 
and the actuality. The same thing Is true 
In foreign policy. The world we live In Ia 
Inhabited by men, not gods, and the Inter-
national situations In which we find our-
selves usually reflect all of the shortcomings 
and Imperfections to which mankind Is heir. 
In some Instances, our foreign policy will 
follow a particular course to meet a glven 
set of circumstances. In the light of all 
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these circumstances It will seem like the 
best possible course and few, If any of us, 
will criticize It or raise any questions about 
lt. Then, 3 or 4 years later, some who have 
an oversupply of the wisdom of hindsight 
and a special aptitude !or Monday-morning 
quarterbacking, will suddenly discover that 
the course that we took 3 or 4 years before 
was all wrong. Naturally, to exercise this 
kind of wisdom, one has to have a very short 
memory and a well-developed ability to 
transplant. One has to be able to forget 
all the circumstances that existed at the 
time the course was originally set, and to 
transplant that course Into the circum-
stances that exist today. 
All o! us have some of this kind of wis-
dom. It Is the kind of wisdom that makes us 
say to ourselves or our friends "!! I had only 
bought a hundred head of cattle back In 
1940, I would be In fine shape today because 
the price of beef Is high In 1951." When 
we Indulge our fancy In this way, of course, 
we have to forget that back In 1940 we didn't 
have tte price of a hundred head of cattle; 
or If we had, we would not have been able 
to buy a ranch to graze them on. A little 
of this wisdom doesn't do us any damage. 
It Is a harmless pastime when practiced by 
Individuals. We think about "what might 
have been" for a few moments and then go 
about the very real business of living In the 
present. But In connection with :foreign 
policy, I! we keep at this Monday morning 
quarterbacking day In and day out, month 
1n and month out, year In and year out, It 
occupies so much of our time and energy as 
a Nation that we have very little left o! 
either to deal with the pressing situations or 
the day. And some Americans are doing ex-
actly that. The result Is that the attention 
o! all o! us Is deflected !rom the pressing 
problems o! current International life. If 
you have felt confused about foreign policy, 
and who among us hasn't, you can explain 
much o! that confusion by the constant 
harangue to which we are subjected to look 
backward, tnstcad of around us and forward. 
It Is a harangue that originates In the same 
kind o! mentality that told us to look back 
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at the "good old days" when we were trying 
to fight our way out o! the depression In the 
thirties. 
What you hear today Is that everything 
would be all right with the Nation and the 
world If only we hadn't tried, during the 
war, to get along with the Russians; 1! only 
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister 
Churchill hadn't signed the Tehran and 
Yalta agreements, and President Truman the 
Potsdam agreement. What these Monday-
morning quarterbacks conveniently forget, 
of course, Is that 1! we hadn't been fighting 
with some allies on our side In World War 
II we might still be locked In combat with 
Germany and Japan or have been destroyed 
by those countries. We might have had 
casualties of five million or ten m1111on or 
twenty-five mUllon Instead o! the mUllon or 
more that we suffered. What the Monday 
morning quarterbacks forget Is that we got 
along with Russian and made those agree-
ments at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam In 
order to shorten World War n and to make 
an attempt at establishing a aaats for an 
enduring peace. Who among us, at the time, 
objected to these purposes? 0! course cir-
cumstances have changed since 1945. Of 
course some of the decisions taken at these 
conferences are Inapplicable In the present 
situation. This does not mean that the 
agreements at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam 
were the work of scoundrels or Incompetents. 
Least of all does It mean that If these agree-
ments had never been made the Nation would 
be better off. That wm be known only when 
the events of this century-all the events-
are vlewecl In the perspective of history. 
But Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam belong 
to a past era-the era of the rise of fascist 
totalitarianism and Its defeat. Today, the 
primary threat to our Nation, to peace, and 
to democratic progress stems !rom a new 
totalltarlanlam which has Its core In Soviet 
Imperialism. President Roosevelt at Yalta 
and President Truman at Potsdam both tried 
to prevent a development of thla kind. Both 
sought, at the end of the greatest war, to . 
put a stop to further wars and the threat 
of wars. They tried to avoid a spUt amo~ 
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the victors and to bring together all of the 
nations of the world Into the forward surge 
of mankind. Isn't that what all of us 
wanted In 1945? Was It wrong to make this 
attempt? I think that the Ideal was well 
worth striving for and I think we should 
continue to strive for it. 
Events since 1945, however, have clearly 
shown that the Ideal of a world without the 
threat of war remains, as It long has been, 
one of the most elusive dreams of mankind. 
As a Nation, we cannot lose ourselves In 
dreams of the future, just as we cannot talce 
refuge In the mlght-have-beens of the past. 
We must continue to live with the realities 
of the present. 
And the most significant of these realities 
Is that there Is once again loose In the world 
a nation bent upon world domination. To 
meet this new situation, the course of our 
foreign p::Jlicy Is being adjusted as rapidly 
ns those who wring their hands over the 
past or who are lest In the future wlll 
permit. 
By the end of 1946 and the beginning of 
1947, the alms of the Soviet Union had be-
come quite clear. While this country had 
disarmed hastily, the Russians had con-
tinued to keep an enormous mass of soldiers 
In a state of readiness, and had embarked 
upon a program of ruthless expansion. They 
had not only ccmpromlsed the Independence 
of countries along their frontier, but Inter-
national communism was eating Its way Into 
Western Europe via the roads of economic 
misery, social discontent and political 1n-
stab111ty. Greece and Turkey were under 
relentless Comrnunlst pressure. 
It does not take an expert In foreign 
allalrs to see what a collapse In Western 
Europe and the Middle East at that time 
would have meant to the security of this 
Nation and to the world. 
Th? United States plus Western Europe 
plus the:.r associated countries now have an 
annua11=roductlon of steel and pig Iron more 
than 4 times that of the Soviet world; 
they produce 3 times as much coal and 
10 times as much pet~oleum. Move the re-
sources of Western Europe and the asso-
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elated countries to the Soviet side and the 
comparisons change drastically. 
But beyond the naked fact of the balance 
of power, the nations which were about to 
collapse In late 1947 were the birthplace and 
cradle of western civilization. The Institu-
tions under which we live, the hopes we 
cherish, the origins of most of our citizens, 
were rooted In those countries. All of them 
have contributed In some fashion to life as 
we know it. With a return to stability they 
could be expected to continue to contribute 
to the advance of civilization. Were we, 
then, to abandon them, In 1947, to a new 
barbarism? 
We met this threat to the western world 
with great unity of purpose. On March 12, 
1947, the President proposed to Congress that 
the United States extend economic and mili-
tary aid to Greece and Turkey. Under the 
leadenhlp of a great Republican Senator, 
the late Arthur vandenberg, Congress passed 
the necessary legislation by an overwhelm-
Ing bipartisan vote. This measure-the 
Truman doctrine-was the real beginning of 
our struggle to guard the Nation against the 
new tyzanny looming on the horizon. From 
this doctrine has sprung the Marshall plan, 
the North Atlantic Treaty, the mutual de-
fense assistance program, economic and 
military assistance to countries In the Far 
and Near East and other significant actions 
of foreign policy. These are the programs 
which have so far prevented the S:>vlet 
Union from striking for world domination 
and precipitating a general war. They have 
had, until recently, wide bipartisan support. 
I need not review all the details Of these 
programs, but I should like to survey briefly 
some of the progress which bas been made 
In carrying them out. Just this month, at 
General Eisenhower's request, I had occa-
sion to visit Europe and to observe this 
progress first-hand. 
As of the first months of 1951 the basic 
alms of the Marshall plan had been largely 
although not completely, achieved. The 
Communists In Western Europe had made 
every effort to sabotage the proj..-ct, and they 
had failed. I ndustrial output had risen al-
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most 40 percent above the level of 1938; trade 
and exchange dltncultles had lessened con-
siderably; and there were good prospects for 
continuing economic Improvement. 
The threat of political collapse, so !H'>Jte In 
1947, has been averted. Discontent, by no 
means, has dlsappeared-as the results or the 
recent eltction In Italy show-but ~he gloom 
of defeatl:::m that hung over the rc;:ion has 
lifted. Europeans dare to believe a:;ain In 
a future of freedom. 
To protect these gains In We~ tern E•.lrope, a 
far-reaching security system has b~t>n es-
tablished. The United Nations cha1 ter hus 
provided the basis for this system. It ex-
plicitly recognizes the Inherent and lUnda-
mental right of member states to dctend 
themselves collectively against attack and 
provides !or the formation of regional secur-
ity arrangements. Under these pro·;tslons 
we had, In September 1947, already Joined 
with the Latin American countries In estab-
lishing a 11ystem of mutual defense !or the 
Western Hemisphere. After the passage of 
the Vandenberg resolution by the S:mate 
In June 1948, with Its obvious reference to 
the North Atlantic community, this country 
began to work out a plan of mutual defense 
with the Western European nations. On 
April 4, 1949, twelve nations-the United 
States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Italy, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Den-
mark, Norway, Iceland, and Portugal--signed 
the North Atlantic Treaty. 
The purpose of this treaty Is strictly de-
fensive. It threatens no nation except a 
would-be aggressor. It operates primarily as 
a deterrent, serving formal notice that an 
attack upon any part of the Atlantic com-
munity w!ll be met with the united resist-
ance of the whole. I! the RU!:!:Ians ever 
nourished the expectation that the rlpene:l 
plum of a recovered Europe could be plucked 
with Impunity, they now know differently. 
The organization to carry out the obliga-
tions of this treaty Is already In operation. 
Most of the m!l!tnry commanders have been 
appointed and the strategic plans nrc being 
placed In readiness. Under the Mutual De-
fense Assistance Act, we are trying to ftll 
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what General Eisenhower called the great, 
the crying need (for) the Impedimenta o! 
armies, of navies, of air forces. 
The sudden outbreak of the Korean aggres-
sion compelled the free world to revise Ita 
estimate of Soviet Intentions. We have 
speeded up the delivery of military supplies 
to Europe and Increased our commitments 
In this respect. A decision has been made to 
Include Wc:::tern German contributions to the 
defense pool and consideration Is being gtven 
to adding others !rom Spa!n. 
In a further effort to bolster western de-
fenses and to fortify the morale of the west-
ern Europeans who dread an occupation by 
Red troops, even though the Soviet Union 
might eventually be defeated, the United 
States recently decided to send four Army 
dlvts!ons to Western Germany In addition to 
the two already there. There was consider-
able opposition to this step in some quar-
ters !or several reasons, prominent among 
which was a fear that large American forces 
might be drawn Into a land war against the 
vast populations commanded by the Soviet 
Union. Secretary ot Defense Marshall, how-
ever, has made clear that the plan Is for the 
Western Europeans to supply the bulk of the 
land armies needed !or their defense. 
That Soviet aggression can be deterred has 
been demonstrated over and over again. The 
record which has been achieved during the 
past 5 years has come from following a course 
of no appeasement, cooperation with free na-
tions, and devotion to peace. We have ne-
gotiated with the Russians-as In the case 
of Berlin-but we have not appeased. We 
have yielded to the wishes ot our All!es on 
some Issues and they have yielded to ours 
on others. Here at home we have refused 
to retreat Into a new Isolationism and, at 
the same time, we have held In check those 
who think that a bomb dropped on Moscow 
will not only begin a war but end it. 
What Is the record of the past 5 years In 
br!e!? The Soviet Union has not dared to 
precipitate a general war; Yugoslavia bas 
broken loose from the Moscow chains; 
Greece--the gateway to the Middle East--
bas been saved from destruction. Efforts 
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ot the Communists to capture Western 
Europe by captalizlng on economic misery 
and social unrest have been thwarted by the 
European recovery plan. The menace of 
Communist armed aggression has been coun-
teracted by the North Atlantic defense pro-
gram. The Berlin airlift was a dramatic 
demonstration of the manner In which west-
ern determination and technical ability can 
create a situation In which bona fide nego-
tiations with the Russians became possible. 
The record of our foreign policy In Europe 
Ia a record of accomplishment, written In 
aplte of the dire predictions of a few In our 
midst who continue to Ignore the responsl-
bllltles of the hour while they read and re-
read the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam agree-
ments. 
Or I! It Is not these agreements, then It Is 
the Far East that occupies them practically 
to the exclusion of the rest of the world. It 
Is aa though the sun of International events 
not only rlaes In the east but also sets In the 
east. 
This Is the region that baa given rise to 
most of the conflict over our foreign policy. 
The typhoon now raging about Capital Hill 
In Washington originated In the vicinity of 
Formosa. Typhoon Is one or the few words 
ln the English language that Is derived from 
the Chinese. It Is taken from two Chinese 
characters--"dle" and "tung" which, to-
gether, mean "big wind." It Is quite a ty-
phoon-this controversy over tar-eastern 
policy-and, like most of the storms that 
blow out or the China Sea, It Is full of sound 
and fury. 
This sound and fury, unfortunately, con-
ceals a wide belt of calm-an area of sub-
stantial agreement upon which a stable far-
eastern policy can be conducted. There is, 
tor example, practically no disagreement 
among responsible persons In the Govern-
ment as to the fundamental facts of the 
Asian situation today. The administration 
and qualified Members cf Congress have long 
recognized them and General MacArthur, In 
his farewell address to both Houses, reviewed 
them. 
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In Asia, today, we are race-to-face with a 
transition of continental proportions. 
Events of the past few years have stirred 
half the population of the earth-more than 
a billion human beings-Into a state of rest-
less agitation. 
These people di1Ier widely In race, culture, 
and outlook. In some ways, however, their 
lot has been the same. Over the centuries, 
most of them acquiesced In the rule of native 
tyrants or the control of foreigners. Most or 
them endured-seemln;;ly without com-
plaint--a ll!e or Ignorance, disease and In-
credible poverty. Bllllons were born, lived 
out a brief life span-usually under 30 
years-and died. Millions were swept away 
In a stroke, by !amine, flood or epidemic. 
These catastrophes were quickly forgotten In 
the struggle of the living to survive. Life 
went on-compelling and unchanging. This 
was the "Changeless East." 
But beneath the surface serenity of resig-
nation, a ferment of discontent has been 
churning tor decades, building up great pres-
sures for social and political change. Prom 
time to time, there were warning signs, as 
for example, the Chinese Revolution of 1911 
and the rioting and Insurrections through-
out southern and sou thea[· Asia between the 
two wars. 
Then came World War II and the surface 
calm gave way once and for all under Its 
p:>werful Impetus. Vast forces were released. 
Prom Korea to Pakistan, from Mongolia to 
the Philippines-tidal waves of unrest rolled 
over this Immense area. Millions or people 
were caught up In the cross-currents, pro-
pelled by two fundamental drives-a com-
mon determination to end foreign domina-
tion and to do something a~out the crushing 
poverty which, for centuries, had produced 
the cycle of birth, miserable life and early 
death. 
The transition which Is taking place In the 
Far East Is not a gentle one. In many places, 
It already has engendered violence on a scale 
unprecedented In recent history. Millions 
h:.ve died as a direct or Indirect result of the 
clvU conflicts In China and southeast Asia 
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and In the religious strife that marked the 
partition of the Indian subcontinent. Mil· 
lions more have been uprooted and are on 
the move. They are seeking new roots to 
sustain Hfe and to give It meaning and 
direction. 
These, then, are the facts of the Far East 
or 1951. Half the world 1s In transition, 
and often, In violent transition. This transi-
tion holds tremendous posslblllties for good 
but It also carries the seeds of a potentially 
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enormous evU. I 
If the new nations of the Far East can 
maintain their Independence and the new 
governments can deal effectively with the 
accumulated problems of their people, there 
Is every reason to bel1eve that they wlll make 
a profound contribution to their own devel-
opment, to the cause of peace and to the gen-
eral advancement of mankind. It, on the 
other hand, they fall victims to a ne'Y Im-
perialism-whether It be of the type recently 
advanced by Japan or the more subtle type 
now emanating from the Soviet Union-If 
this should occur, then the rest of the world 
and we as a part of It, would be exposed to 
a grave danger. 
There Is a real prospect of this happening 
because In the confusion and frustrations of 
the hour, men often turn to the easy way out, 
the quick and unreasoned solution to their 
difficulties. Communism or other reactionary 
movements, based on such slogans as "Asia 
for the Asians" offer very real enticements, 
howe't"er delusive, to the hungry and dis-
contented. 
Some may wish that the facts In the Par 
East were otherwise. Some may long for 
the old days of the "changeless East" and Its 
"unspoiled charm," but these cannot be 
recalled. 
The fact 1s that we must conduct tar 
eastern policy within the framework of a 
"changing East"-a rapidly, erratically and, 
frequently, violently "changing East." To 
Imagine that the situation 1s otherwise will 
lead us to build a pol1cy on sands of un-
real1ty and to court, thereby, Its repeated 
collapses. 
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But recognition of the facts of tbe situa-
tion In Asia is only one prerequisite to 
sound pol1cy. For the Far East Is only a 
part of the larger framework of foreign pollcy 
which Is the globe ltsel!. And far eastern 
pol1cy, If It Is to serve the Nation, must be 
viewed In that total perspective. We cannot 
concentrate our attention exclusively on Asia. 
To do so, 1s to Ignore regions which, at this 
moment In history, are at least as vital. 
In the Far East we can bring to bear a 
prudent part of the resources which we have 
avallable for International purposes In an 
effort to Influence developments In the direc-
tion or peace, freedom, and progress. We 
cannot deploy all our resources to that area 
without leaving others, such as Europe and 
the Middle East, dangerously exposed. 
There are some situations In the Far East 
with which, by working constructively with 
others, we can deal effectively. In these sit-
uations we should act, and we are acting. But 
under no circumstances ought we to assume 
unilateral responslblllty for everything that 
happens In Asia or for the future of that 
vast continent. Under no circumstances 
should we overcommit ourselves, even In the 
name of an anti-Communist crusade. 
Korea Is not the only country In the world 
that Hves In the shadow of Communist lm-
perlal1sm. Communism, Itself, Is not the 
first form of tyranny that has threatened 
the world, nor Is It, necessarlly, the last. 
The way to a world of freedom and Inter-
national decency Is long and diMcult and we 
wlll do well to draw judiciously upon our 
strength as we move along lt. 
In general, that Is what we have done ln 
the Far East and that Is what we are doing 
now. Mistakes have been made and others 
may be expected. Foreign policy 1s made by 
human beings and human beings make mis-
takes. As I have already pointed out, all of 
us contribute directly or Indirectly to our 
foreign policy and we share responslblllty for 
its success or !allure. 
I think, however, that we need not be 
ashamed of the course we have pursued 1n 
the Far East for 5 years. When It ls viewed 
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ln Its entirety, within the framework of the 
facts of Asia and the larger framework of 
the global situation-the record Is good. I 
go further and suggest that beneath the 
sound and fury of the present controversy, 
lt will be found that most persons In this 
country-regardless of party-generally have 
supported and wm continue to support that 
policy. 
Let us examine this thesis against the rec-
ord of our activity In the Far East since 1945. 
In the Ph111pplnes we fulfilled promptly 
our long-standing pledge to grant Independ-
ence to the Islands. We kept our wartime 
promise to aid In reconstruction, providing 
tor this purpose technical assistance, hun-
dreds of m1lllons of dollars of direct com-
pensation to those who suffered losses, and 
surplus property of enormous value at a 
negligible prtce. In 1946, we also worked out 
mutual defense arrangements that are de-
signed to safeguard the Ph111pplnes from a 
repetition of Invasion as well as to enhance 
our own security. 
AB far as I can determine, there has been 
no serious opposition to any of these meas-
ures In Congress or out of Congress. They 
have had wide bipartisan support. It Is 
not over the Pha•.pplne policy, then, that the 
present controversy rages. 
But In spite of our efforts and those of 
many conscientious Filipinos, the islands 
have not ;...ade the progress which might have 
been expected. 
Last year there were alarming reports that 
the Ph1llpplnes might ~;o the way of China. 
The reasons advanced were 1r.uch the same-
.::orruption In government, unfair economic 
advantage to a favored few at the expense of 
the many, and the growth In strength of a 
Communist-led revolutionary group in the 
countryside. 
What could we have done In these circum-
stances? Reverse the Independence granted 
a few short years ago and reoccupy the 
islands? To Ulustrate the difficulty in such 
a course, I might point out that when we 
requested permission to post marines as 
guards.at our Embassy In Manna because of 
the tense situation, the Ph111pplne Govern-
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ment hotly rejected the request as an af-
front to Its sovereignty. But even tr the , 
course of reoccupatlon were feasible, the 
direct control of the PhUipplnes would re-
quire an enormous allocation of our eco-
nomic and mUitary resources. What would 
be left for other areas? Are the American 
people willing to assume an Increased tax 
burden and new casualty lists for this pur-
pose? 
A second alternative would be to abandon 
the Islands to their fate and risk their fall-
Ing Into unfriendly hands. One considera-
tion-and there are others-Indicates how 
dangerous this co,_;rse would be. We regard 
Formosa as vital to the security of the Pa-
cific. How much more so are the Ph111p-
plnes. 
Confronted with a set of facts of this kind, 
our Phlllpplne pollcy has taken the only 
direction ,that Is practical. We have not 
assumed primary responsibility for the 
political administration, the Internal se-
curity or the domestic economy of the Ph111p-
plnes. The F111plno people were demanding, 
In effect, the right to deal with these prob-
lems themselves when tbey sought Independ-
ence. We conceded them that right when 
we set them free. These prob!e··.1s, prop-
erly, are the primary responsib111ty of the 
Fil1plnos. Our role, necessarlly, Is that of a 
neighbor who has had a long and close rela-
tionship with the Islands. In this role we 
have increased our m111tary assistance and 
our technical aid to help them meet the 
present abnormal situation. The President 
has gone a step further and has called upon 
the Ph111pplne Government to undertake 
certain basic reforms as a condition for addi-
tional economic help. The Filipinos have 
given evidence or a willingness to make the 
necessary improvements and Congress is now 
considering a measure which wm provide 
that help. 
We cannot be certain that this policy will 
succeed. There 1s no assurance that as a 
result of it the Philippines will emerge as a 
progressive and stable member or the free 
world. In the planning and execution of 
foreign policy there are rarely certainties. 
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The most that we can hope for ls that we 
have chosen the best possible course of action 
in the llght of a glven set of circumstances. 
Many people have complained about the 
sltuatlon In the Phlllpplnes but no one, so 
far as I am aware, has offered a pollcy ap-
proach dltrerlng basically from the three I 
have suggested here. That ls--get ln, get 
out, or help out. The way we have chosen 
1s neither the way of lmperlallsm whlch 1s to 
get ln, nor the way of lsolatlonlsm whlch 1s 
to get out. It ls the American way, whlch 
ls to help out. 
I have dwelt at length on the Phlllpplnes 
for lt lllustrates the com:Jlex problems whlch 
confront our pollcy-makers elsewhere ln the 
Far East. In southern and southeast Asla 
we have also sought to deal wlth the facts 
of the situation ln the same way-neither 
by getting ln nor getting out, but by helping 
out. We have cooperated wlth many friendly 
na tlons ln thls reglon. 
In the caseo of Indonesia, we contributed 
through the Unlted Nations, to lts relatively 
peac~ful transltlon from colonial status to 
independence. We are now attempting to 
bring about a slmllar transition In Indo-
china In the face of a Communist-led re-
volt. Throughout this vast area o! southern 
and southeast Asla, we have In operation, 
today, programs o! economic, technical and 
mllltary assistance and cultural exchange. 
Only recently Congress passed legislation to 
make avallable graln for Indla ln an efJort 
to forestall a threatened ramlne. 
These programs represent a judlclous use 
or the resources whlch we are able to allo-
cate to this region. They are gestures of 
sincere friendship, evidences of our will-
Ingness to help In deeds as well as words. 
They are, as all measures o! this kind ought 
to be, a :nlxture o! generosity and reason-
able self-Interest. 
As In the Philippines, there Is no assur-
ance that all or them will accompllsh the 
purposes for which they are Intended. As 
In the Philippines, primary responslblllty 
rests where it belongs-with the peoples and 
governments of the various recipient nations. 
Taken as a whole, pollcy in southern and 
962236-40018 
10 
southeast Asia has bad overwhelming sup-
port In both Houses of Congress. Thls la 
another area o! substantial bipartisan agree-
ment that the present controversy conceals. 
With respect to Japan, World War II pro-
jected us Into a situation of primary re-
sponslblllty. As the power principally re-
sponsible 1or the Japanese defeat, we were 
compelled to occupy the vacuum which that 
defeat produced and to exercise the primary 
authonty which that occupation entailed. 
After VJ-day, pollcy !or Japan, conceived 
and prepared by the State and Defense De-
partments under the President's direction 
was carried out by General MacArthur until 
his replacement by General Ridgway as Su-
preme Commander. Most available reports 
lndlcntl' that the occupation has been ad-
mirably conducted. The Japanese have 
made considerable progress in democra-
tizing their social and political Institutions 
and, with substantial American assistance, 
have done much to restore their battered 
economy. We are movlng, now, toward a 
peace settlement with or without Soviet 
partlclpatlon. Once a treaty has been slgned, 
we hope that Japan wlll make a contribution 
to the maintenance of peace and orderly In-
ternational progress. We wlll, then, get out 
o! that country but stlll wlll be ln a position 
to help out, l! necessary, particularly wlth 
respect to defense against aggression from 
the mainland. 
There have been scattered criticisms of our 
occupation o! Japan under General Mac-
Arthur's direction. Some have said that lt 
was "too so!t" and some that lt was "too 
hard." The balance of Informed oplnlon, 
however, has been favorable. Certainly, 
there has been little criticism or lt In Con-
gress by either party. In thls cas~. too, the 
sound and fury or partisan crltlclsm or far-
eastern pollcy had drowned out an extremely 
Important area of agreement. 
Having pas~ed through a belt or calm 
enclrcllng the Philippines, southern an<1 
southeast Asia and Japan. we come to Chlna 
which Is at the very core or the storm. I 
should llke to state at the out11et that I do 
not believe any reasonable pers:m woul<1 
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have conducted China policy very much dlf-
terently than It has been conducted since 
1945. We have had three Secretaries or 
State since the end of World War II-James 
Byrnes, General Marshall, and Dean Acheson. 
All three were confronted with a given set 
of facts. All three approached these facts 
In substantially the same manner. 
To make the point clearer, let us go back to 
VJ-day. At that time, we had air and naval 
power In the Western Pacific. We had a 
small torce In China, mostly service troops. 
General MacArthur had advised General 
Wedemeyer who was then In command In 
China that he could not spare additional men 
!rom his armies which were scheduled to 
serve In the Japanese occupation. 
In China there were two major opposing 
military forces, one under the control of the 
Communists and the other under the control 
ot the Nationalists. The Communists were 
spread all over the North China countryside 
ready to move Immediately on the great east-
ern cities and Into Manchuria. If civil war 
came, they had a decided positional advan-
tage. 
The Nationalist armies were In west and 
south China, tar !rom the major strategic 
centers. They had overwhelming superiority 
in numbers and equipment but because of 
China's Incredibly poor transportation sys-
tem, they could not get this superiority Into 
position to make It effective. 
In these circumstances we had to choose 
a course !rom among three alternatives--
the same three which we have faced all over 
Asia: To get In, to get out, or to help out. 
In this case, to get In woUld have meant 
stopping the Impending civil war at what-
ever coat to ourselves, using our soldiers In 
whatever number required, and assuming 
!ull responsibility for restoring all of China 
to Chiang's rule. Would the Chinese peo-
ple, wh<>se suspicion or foreign Interference 
In their Internal affairs Is traditional, have 
welcomed this move? Would we, ourselves, 
In 1945 have tolerated committing an un-
known number of our men to China for an 
Indefinite period? To get In, In this sense, 
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even It desirable, was manl!estly impracti-
cable. 
Could we have gotten out? We could 
have; but It would have meant leaving 3,000,-
0CO Japane!:e soldiers and c1v1llans In China, 
since the Nationalist Government was 
Incapable of handling their repatriation. It 
would have meant abandoning the National-
1st Government which we recognized and 
had supported throughout the conflict with-
out an opportunity to restore stab111ty to 
war-torn China. Furthermore, the evidence 
we had, then, Indicated that most of the 
Chinese people still looked to this Govern-
ment !or leadership In bringing all the !ac-
tions together, In preventing civil war, and 
In reconstructing the country. 
Therefore, we took the third alternative. 
We helped out--not the Chinese Communist 
but the legal, Natlonallst Government of 
China. We transported by sea and air 400 to 
500 thousand o! Chiang Kal-sbek's troops 
over and around the Communist forces. These 
troops went Into key strategic sectors In 
east and north China. Fi!ty thousand Amer-
Ican marines held such vital centers of com-
munication as Pe1p1ng, Tientsin, and Tslng-
tao to prevent their seizure by the Chinese 
Communists. 
Furthermore, we continued to supply the 
National Government with lend-lease aid 
!or months after the conclusion of the war. 
By the end of 1945, we had delivered su!-
tlclent tonnage to equip 39 divisions o! 
ground forces and an 8% -group air force. 
In December 1945, Chiang Ka1-shek held a 
numerical superiority over the Communists 
o! 5 to 1. He had a monopoly of heavy 
equipment and mechanical transport and 
an unoppoEed air arm. He held the key 
communications centers. Yet by December 
1948, exactly 3 years later, this preponder-
ance o! strength had been so dissipated that 
General Barr, head o! our m111tary advisory 
mission In China, was forced to conclude that 
without direct Involvement o! the United 
States with Its combat forces, the defeat 
of the Nationalists on the mainland was 
Inevitable. 
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What lies behind this amazing fatlure? 
You w111 hear It blamed on General Mar-
shall's attempt to mediate between the Na-
tionalists and the Communists. The fact Is 
that the Nationalists occupied more strategic 
military positions when General Marshall left 
China at the end of 1946 than when he ar-
rived at the beginning of 1946. The fact Is 
that In mediating, General Marshall was 
following the established policy of the Na-
tionalist Government. For years Chiang had 
clajmed that he was trying to settle the 
Communist question by political methods 
and not by civil war. 
You will hear that the failure came about 
because General Marshall tried to force the 
Nationalists to take Communists Into the 
government. The fact Is that Communists 
had been brought Into the government by 
Chiang, himself, long before Marshall ever 
arrived In China. The fact Is that not a 1\ln-
gle Communist was added to that govern-
ment as a result of General Marshall's media-
tion. The fact Is that the Marshall mission 
was welcomed by Chiang with open arms and 
he prevailed on General Marshall to remain 
as mediator when the latter wanted to with-
draw. 
If any prominent American In 1946 op-
posed Marshall's trip to China to mediate the 
Chinese con1Uct between the major opposing 
groups, he gave no public and, as far as I 
can determine, private expression of his dis-
agreement. In December 1945, General Mac-
Arthur, General Wedemeyer, and Admiral 
Spruance sent the following message to 
Washington from the Far East before Gen-
eral Marshall's departure: 
"It Is suggested that United States assist-
ance to China be made available as a basis 
for negotiation by the American Ambassa-
dor to bring together and etJect a compromise 
between the major opposing groups In order 
to promote a unified democratic China." 
In June 1951, Admiral Spruance says that 
the negotiations between the "major oppos-
Ing groups" In this message meant between 
the Communists and Nationalists; General 
Wedemeyer first Implied that It didn't and 
then that It did. General MacArthur, how-
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ever, dissents and speaks of the Communists 
as "but a nebulous threat" at the time. You 
can understand some of the difficulties of 
conducting foreign policy when there ls dis-
agreement among three prominent mUitary 
leaders as to who the "major opposing 
forces" In China were ln 1945. 
Another reason advanced for the Nation-
alist collapse on the mainland Is the Inade-
quacy of American ald. We are asked, In 
etiect, to be ashamed or ourselves and to feel 
guUty for falling to be more generous to-
wards Chiang Kal-shek. 
But since VJ-day this country has ex-
tended miHtary and economic aid valued 
at about two btlllon dollars to the Chinese 
Government. Two billion dollars of taxpay-
ers• money to Chiang Kal-shek. It Is possi-
ble, ot course, to argue the precise amount. 
Millions of words have been wasted In prov-
Ing that It was closer to one billion or three 
billion. Can anyone honestly believe that 
one billion or two billion or five billion dol-
lars more aid would have held the lid on 
the gigantic upheaval that has taken place 
In China these past 5 years? As It was, an 
enormous part of the military equipment 
given to Chiang wound up In the hands of 
the Communists. In the Communist victory 
parades during October 1949 In Pelplng, 
Tientsin, Shanghai, and other cities, cap-
tured American arms and equipment 
streamed past the reviewing stands hour 
after hour. Where did this equipment 
come from? From Nationalist armies which 
surrendered or went over to the Communists. 
Where Is It now? A lot of It Is In Korea-
In the hands of our enemies. Yet, the ad-
ministration Is scolded for not having done 
more of the same thing. 
Can anyone honestly believe that more 
arms and a thousand American mllltary ad-
visors In place of the 500 that served Chiang 
would have saved the National Government 
on the mainland? Would additional ald 
have curbed that government's disastrous 
strategy? Would lt have created a fighting 
morale? Would lt have put an end to cor-
ruption and .ntsrule? 
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Tbe fact Is that our help failed because 
there waa ml.aalng In the Nationalist Gov-
ernment at that time, the will and ability to 
uae our help eft'ectlvely. We could not sup-
ply the will, and If we had tried to supply 
the abUity, In all probability we would have 
had to get In completely. 
Only since It baa been confined to the Is-
land of Formosa baa Chiang's government 
begun to take the neceasary mcaaures to 
make Itself truly responsive to the needs or 
the ordinary Chinese people. In these cir-
cumstances, there Is aome hope that the 
economic and military aaslstance which we 
are atul supplying to the Island or Formosa 
can prove eft'ectlve. We are justified In con-
tinuing that aid, just aa we are justified In 
continuing to recognize the National Gov-
ernment, because It Ia becoming more rep-
resentative of the real aaplratlons of the 
Chinese people aa the Communist regime 
1n Peking grows leas representative. Since 
1t emerged !rom the countryside, the latter 
baa steadily drawn away from the people of 
China and tbelr real 1ntefe&t8. It has be-
come more and more a tool or Russian for-
eign policy, ~rmlttlng Itself finally to be 
led Into a course or toaslng thousands of 
.Chinese Uvea to senseless alaughter In the 
Korean aggresalon. 
Despite the complexity or the Chinese 
situation, I believe that once the !acts are 
fully appreciated, there will be little real 
dl.aagreement on the part of most Ameri-
cans that the course we followed In China 
was about the only reasonable one we 
could have followed. Tbere was not too lit-
tle American support !or the National Gov-
ernment. U anything, In the light or 
known circumstances, there was too much. 
Tbe same Is not true ror Korea. In that 
country, on June 25, 1950, Communist Im-
perialism, for the first time since the end 
of World War II, resorted to the tactic of 
armed Invasion. The lasue Immediately be-
came larger than Korea. It became, In the 
final analysis, the l.asue or peace or gen-
eral war. 
The response of the free world to this Issue 
waa Immediate. On June 27, the P:esldent 
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ordered fleet and air units Into action aa the 
UN called upon all nations to assist the victim 
of aggression. Americana gave their spon-
taneous and wholehearted support to the 
decision. 
The objectives which we had In going Into 
Korea, and which we still have, Is to pre-
serve the South Korean Republic; to stop 
and to punish the aggression against that 
Republic; to make clear to all would-be lm-
perlallsts, as we failed to make clear to 
Japanese and Nazi Imperialists In the thir-
ties, that the force or tyranny will be met 
by the force or freedom; that there will be no 
cheap conquests of the weak by the strong; 
that the greater the aggreaslon the greater 
wlll be the fearful retribution. By stopping 
a local aggression we hope to prevent a gen-
eral war later; by fighting In Korea now we 
hope to save this land of ours from attack 
In the future. 
When Capt. James Jabara, the leading 
pllot of the United Nations In Korea, landed 
back In the United States, he waa greeted 
first by a reporter from his home town of 
Wichita, Kans. The reporter asked: "Why 
are we fighting in Korea?" Jabara answered: 
"So that we won't have to fight In Wichita." 
These are the reasons we are In Korea. 
They are fine and decent and sensible rea-
sons. Those who speak disparagingly or 
cynically of them prostitute the finest part 
of the American Ideal-a willingness to sac-
rifices now so that our children and our 
children's children shall live their liYes In 
a better and more satisfying world. 
What we did not set out to do In Korea, 
what we were not required by any mandate of 
the United Nations to do, waa to unify all 
of Korea by force. The task of unifying 
K::>rea, Is a task for the Korean people them-
selves with whatever help may be given them 
by the United Nations. What we did not 
set out to do was to conquer Manchuria. 
What we did not set out to do was to carry 
Chiang Kai-Shek back to the mainland on 
the shield of the United States. What we did 
not set out to do was to begin world war III. 
We fa!Jed once to distinguish what we 
set out to do and what we did not set out 
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to do in Korea. I trust that we shall not 
f&tl again. Last November, United Nations 
forces had scored the remarkable victory 
that carried them from practically a beach-
head at Pusan back to the thirty-eighth 
parallel. At that point we had accomplished 
what we had set out to do. We had met 
the aggressors, punished them severely, and 
all but destroyed their armies. The security 
of our forces made It necessary to advance 
some distance beyond the thirty-eighth 
parallel. 
When these forces had reached the nar-
row defensible neck of the Korean peninsula, 
some miles so·.tth of the Chinese border, I 
urged that we call a halt to the advance and 
try to create a buffer zone along the Chinese 
Manchurian and Korean frontier. But, ap-
parently, In the mistaken belief that the 
Chinese Communists would not enter ·the 
war, that we could "end the war by Christ-
mas" our troops were sent probing, in dan-
gerously extended lines, towards the Chinese 
border. 
The rest is too well known to you to bear 
extensive repeating. The Chinese Com-
munists entered the conflict. We suffered a 
major defeat. Some of those who just a few 
weeks before had been most vociferous In 
urging our advance to the Chinese border 
now began to pre~s for two alternatives-
either the complete abandonment of Korea 
or the extension of the war all the way Into 
Manchuria and beyond. This "get in or 
get out" extremism would have profited no 
one but our enemies. 
To have abandoned Korea, at that moment, 
would have been to sacrifice the very pur-
poses for which we entered the conflict. It 
would have meant laying not only all of 
Korea but all of the Far East open to new 
attacks by Communist Imperialism. To have 
extended the war to the Chinese mainland, 
on the other hand, would have meant an 
involvement-when considered In the light 
of the critical situations elsewhere-far be-
yond our m!l!tary capacity at the time to 
support. The latter course could have had 
only two outcomes. I! the S:>v!et Union 
chose to back the Chinese Communists, It 
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would have meant the beginning of world 
war III. If, on the other hand, the Rus-
sians chose to stay out, it would have meant 
a unilateral Involvement of this country on 
the Chinese mainland. 
In the first case we would have had the 
very thing which, In our own Interests and 
In the Interests of civilization, we are try-
Ing to prevent. In the second case, we would 
have had what General Bradley so aptly 
termed "wrong war, wrong place, wrong 
time, wrong enemy." 
Suppose we gained this cheap and easy 
victory over the Chinese Communists which 
some seemed to think possible by the use o! 
our air and sea power and Chiang's troops. 
What would we have gained except the con-
tinuing responsibility of trying to keep the 
Generalissimo In power In a devastated China 
at untold b1111ons of dollars In costs? 
And If we did not defeat the Chinese Com-
munists easily, what then? We would do 
as we have done In Korea, send Ground Forces 
in after sea and air power had failed to bring 
an immediate victory. The vast maw or 
the Chinese mainland can absorb millions of 
ground troops. We could tie up the bulk of 
our m1l!tary resources In a secondary arena 
of combat, leaving Western Europe--the real 
prize-and other vital areas bare to Soviet 
conquest. If world war III must come, It 
will not be won or lost In south China. 
We have to keep our eyes on the objective, 
and the place to do this at the present time 
Is in Korea. Under General Ridgway's com-
mand, the United Nations have once again 
returned to a position roughly comparable 
to the one held last December. Once again 
a moment of decision Is at hand. 
It is a moment to restate the alms of our 
foreign policy. That policy Is and must con-
tinue to be based on the principles of no ap-
peasement and peace-not peace at any price, 
but peace as long as it Is humanly and de-
cently and honorably possible to strive tor it. 
To achieve that peace we must be prepared 
to negotiate, provided the aggressors recog-
nize the error Of their ways and, provided, 
the negotiations lead to a settlement that 
achieves our purp06es. Appeasemeut and 
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negotiation are not the same things. To use 
means other than mllltary to achieve reason-
able International objectives is ln keeping 
with our best traditions. We would do well 
to be wary of partisan tongues In this coun-
try that are quick to lick the label or ap-
peasement on every nonmilitary action we 
take. such tongues could lead our foreign 
policy Into rep~ated blind alleys and, ulti-
mately, Into chaos, unnecessary war, or con-
fused retreat. 
As to specUlc policy based on these prin-
ciples ot no appeasement and peace, I be-
lieve the tacta of the situation suggest that 
the wiseSt course In Korea at this time would 
be for the UN forces to remain In the vicinity 
of the th1rty-e1ghth parallel so that the 
South Korean Republic can be reestablished 
1n Ita own right. Beyond that, South Korean 
forces should be sent farther northward to 
the vicinity of the thirty-ninth parallel so 
aa to Increase the defensive strength of 
South Korea and to establish a status quo 
that can be maintained. In my opinion this 
move wlll be a long step toward stopping 
Stalin's plans to Involve us ln all-out war 
In Asia; It wm allow South Koreans, with 
UN help, to start rebuilding their country, 
and It wm have accomplished our original 
purpose of making clear that aggression 
does not pay. South Korea should assume 
an Increasingly active role In Ita own de-
fense and we should seek greater military 
commitments for Korea from other UN 
members with a view to reducing the size 
ot the American contingent. The Chinese 
may quit Korea In time, but It is necessary, 
at this stage to draw our plans as though 
they will not. As long aa they continue to 
attack, they must be opposed. 
15 
Moving south to Japan, present policy calls 
tor the signing ot a peace treaty at the 
earliest pOSBible time. We are trying to en-
llst aa many as possible ot the World War 
U Allies In this policy. Since the Russians 
continue to make Impossible demands as the 
price ot participation, we are going ahead 
without them. In general, the peace with 
Japan which Is planned will be a peace ot 
reconcUlatlon, with provision made tor de-
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!ense of the country before the occupation 
terminates. ThiS policy must be J:Ushed 
with vigor. 
With respect to Formosa. we cannot per-
mit It to fall Into the hands o! a Chinese 
Ccmmunlst regime which Is ope::ntlng In 
the Interests of a fcrelgn power and Is pur-
sulr.g a reckless ccurse of aggreEslon agalns' 
the United Nations In Korea. On the other 
hand, under present circumstances and at 
the present time, I do not believe we ought 
to back Chiang Kal-shek In an adventure on 
the mainland. Chiang, himself, has Indi-
cated that even with full American assist-
ance, It would take 6 months to make reaay 
tor an attack. 
It is true that all the Nationalists seek 
now Is a little logistical support and some 
American technicians for an Invasion of the 
mainland. On the surface that seems like 
a cheap price to pay tor a diversionary attack 
on the Chinese Communists, and some 
Americans have been attracted by 1t. It 
Is enticing. but It Is also dangerously Illu-
sory. As you probably remember, we began 
the Korean conflict by supplying only logis-
tical support to the South Koreans and, In 
a year, we have built up our commitment 
there to 250,000 men plus extensive sea and 
air forces. There may be circumstances In 
which the use of Chiang's forces are war-
ranted. These circumstances do not now 
exist. 
For the present, the National Government 
has more than enough problems to keep It 
tully occupied on Formosa. It It can do a 
thorough overhauling of Itself, perl:}aps some 
day the Chinese people may be prepared to 
give It another chance on the mainland. 
With regard to the Philippines, our policy 
in the future must continue to be based 
on the Idea of helping the Filipinos fl.nd 
their way to stablllty. We will not, as we 
did not In 1941, tolerate any attack on these 
Islands. 
For the rest ot the Far East, our principal 
effort must be coordinated with the efforts ot 
others ln assisting these countries of south-
ern and southeast Asia to overcome the ac-
cumulated Ills of centuries. We must help 
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them, as decent neighbors, with little fan-
fare and within our means, to produce more 
food and other nece1111ltles, to Improve the 
education of their chUdren, and to elimi-
nate the many health hazards to which they 
are exposed-malaria, typhus, cholera, and 
other epidemic diseases. Projects of this 
kind cost, comparatively, very little money, 
but they engender a lasting good will which 
muttary action can rarely do. Such projects 
also attack some of the baste causes of unrest 
and tnatabutty. 
The problema which exist In Asia, In Eu-
rope, throughout the world, are lmmen~~e. 
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They are, In the last analysts, the problema 
of peace or war, the problema of progresa or 
retreat. We cannot eliminate these prob-
lems by cloetng our eyes and striking out 
blindly at them. Nor can we eliminate them 
by denying that they exist. We can meet 
them only by striving to understand them; 
by closing ranks among ourselves and with 
friendly nations the world over and by bring-
Ing to bear on them our united strength 
and determination; by reamrmtng, as each 
generation must reamrm, that It 111 not In 
tyranny but In freedom that mankind flnda 
hill destiny. 
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